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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
only to the extent to which existing requirements of state
law have not been met.
The most that can fairly be said is that the Hope case
indicates that, if a state commission in appropriate com-
pliance with state law, reduces utility rates after a fair
hearing and is sustained by the state courts, there is little
reason to anticipate any further judicial protection from
the United States Supreme Court on the ground of confis-
cation. It is doubtful, however, whether state courts and
legislatures, which have shown no tendency to move away
from the fair value rule during the last twenty years, will
change overnight with the decision of the Hope case any
more so than they have changed with other alterations or
reversals of doctrine by the Supreme Court.
VESTED AND CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
Sale Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Bouse'
The testatrix died in 1922 and bequeathed one-fourth
of the residue of her estate in trust for her son, Alfred,
for life, and after his death to his child or children living
at the time of his death, but if he should die without leaving
any surviving children, or if his children should all die
before the age of twenty-one years, then to the other chil-
dren of the testatrix, naming them. A similar bequest
was made to her daughter, Mary Helen. Both bequests
were made upon condition that the life tenants make sim-
ilar provision for the devolution of certain other property;
these conditions were complied with by the life tenants,
both of whom executed deeds of trust containing similar
limitations, shortly after the death of the testatrix. Alfred
died in 1940 without any surviving children;2 Mary Helen
died in 1941 leaving three children surviving.3 After the
death of the testatrix and after the execution of the trusts
by the life tenants, but prior to the death of the life ten-
ants, legislation was passed imposing certain inheritance
taxes which, if applicable, would subject the remainders
to taxation. Held: The remainders passing upon the death
1 181 Md. 351, 29 A. (2d) 906 (1943).
'He was a widower and apparently never had any children. See tran-
script of record, p. 56.
, All of the surviving children were born prior to 1922; two other chil-
dren were born to Mary Helen but had died prior to 1922. Ibid.
[VOL. VIII
S. D. & T. CO. v. BOUSE
of Alfred are subject to the tax, but the remainders passing
upon the death of Mary Helen are not.
The Court construed the inheritance tax to be an excise
tax levied on the privilege of receiving property upon the
death of the former owner, a privilege granted by the state
subject to the payment of the tax. Such a tax, they held,
can be constitutionally applied only to a succession taking
place after the enactment of the statute, and the vesting
in interest constitutes the succession. The question then
became one of determining whether the remainders were
vested or contingent prior to the death of the life tenants.
Accepting the Court's analysis of the problem and their
construction of the statute,4 the importance of the case
lies in its discussion of the distinction between vested and
contingent remainders, for it is the latest expression which
the Court of Appeals has made on this subject. In dis-
cussing these concepts they defined a vested remainder
as "one which is limited to a person in being, whose right
to the estate does not depend upon the happening or failure
of any future event", and a contingent remainder as "one
which is either limited to a person not in being or not
certain or ascertained, or so limited to a certain person
that his right to the estate depends upon some contingent
event in the future".5 These definitions are taken almost
verbatim from local texts6 and are typical of the attempts
which have been made to state in a simple, concise rule
I Although there is ample authority for construing such a tax to be a
transfer tax, one may well question some of the dicta regarding the appli-
cation of inheritance taxes to vested remainders. For example, the Court
said: "It is our decision that even though a remainder may have to be
opened to let in after born children, or may be divested as a result of the
death of the remainderman without issue, nevertheless if it is a vested
remainder it is not subject to a subsequent inheritance tax statute, al-
though enacted prior to the end of the life estate". 29 A. (2d) 906, 909.
But they had previously said: ". . . the rate of inheritance tax is to be
determined according to the law in effect at the time when remainders
vest in interest, when the rights of the parties become fixed and certain,
and not when the remainders pass in possession upon the death of the life
tenant. This rule is applicable whether the remainder be vested or con-
tingent". Ibid. Now it should be apparent that there is an inconsistency
in those statements; it is true that remainders which are subject to open
up or which may be completely divested by the happpening of some event
are technically vested, but it is also true that they are not fixed and certain
until they become indefeasibly vested. Consequently, courts which employ
an economic test should sustain taxes imposed at any time before the inter-
est becomes indefeasibly vested on the theory that something of value
passes at that time. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Higgins, 136 F. 2d 477, 478
(C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
SSafe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Bouse, 29 A. (2d) 906, 909
(Md., 1943).
a MILLER, CONSTRUCTON OF WILLS (1927) Sec. 213; VExABLE, SYLLABUs
ON THE LAW or REAL PROPERTY IN MARYLAND (1892) 76-77.
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the distinction between vested and contingent remainders.7
Although one cannot quarrel much with the above defi-
nitions as an abstract statement of the difference between
vested and contingent remainders, the application of them
in the instant case and the results which the Court reached
are subject to criticism.
The remainders following the life estate in Alfred were
properly held contingent since the gift to his sisters was
upon the express conditions that he die without leaving
any surviving children, or that all his children should
die before the age of twenty-one years.8 Thus at the time
of the death of the testatrix, and when the trust deed was
executed, the right of Alfred's sisters to the property pass-
ing upon his death depended upon the happening or fail-
ure of a future event; although the persons who might take
under the limitation to the sisters were in being and cer-
tain, their right to the estate depended upon the happening
of a contingent event in the future. Consequently, the
Court had little difficulty in holding the remainders to
the sisters contingent prior to the death of Alfred in 1940.
The fact that the gift to Alfred's sisters was preceded by
a gift to the children of Alfred, and that at the death of
the testatrix he did not have any children and none were
subsequently born, undoubtedly influenced the Court in
holding the remainders following Alfred's life estate con-
tingent. Obviously a remainder limited to persons not
in being is contingent upon their birth, and since the first
limitation following the life estate thus created a contin-
For other definitions see 2 BL. COMM. *168-169; FEARNE, CONTINGENT
REMAINDERS (4th Am. ed. 1845) *34; GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUI-
TIES (4th ed. 1942) Secs. 25, 27; 1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) Sees.
67-68. For a criticism of such attempts to frame a universal test and to
use it as the determining factor in the solution of all cases involving
remainders see Jones, Vested and Contingent Remainders, a Suggestion
With Respect to Legat Method (1943) 8 Md. L. Rev. 1.
8 It would seem that this last clause could operate only as a divesting
condition creating an executory interest in the children of the testator,
other than the life tenant, which would take effect in case the life tenant
died leaving children surviving who failed to reach twenty-one; otherwise
the condition would be included in the clause providing for a gift over on
death of the life tenant without leaving surviving children. That the Court
construed the clause as creating an executory interest seems clear from
their opinion for, in discussing the nature of the remainder to the children
of the life tenant, they said: "The defeasible nature of the remainders
resulting from the defeat of the remainder interest upon the death of any
child before the age of 21 years does not have the effect of making the
remainders contingent. This possibility of such a loss is a condition subse-
quent, not a condition precedent". Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore
v. Bouse, 29 A. (2d) 906, 909 (Md., 1943). As to the validity of construing
a limitation to create a contingent remainder on one event and an execu-
tory interest on another see 1 SIMEs, Op. cit. 8upra, n. 7, Sec. 110.
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gent remainder, the Court seemed to assume that all fol-
lowing limitations must likewise be contingent.9
On the other hand the Court held the remainders fol-
lowing the life estate in Mary Helen vested as of the date
of the death of the testatrix in spite of the fact that these
interests were created by language similar to, if not iden-
tical with, that used in the gifts following Alfred's life
estate. Can such a result be justified? The only difference
between the situation of the remaindermen who took fol-
lowing the death of Alfred and those who took following
Mary Helen's life estate was the fact that at the time of
the death of the testatrix Alfred had no children and none
were subsequently born to him, so upon his death the prop-
erty passed to his sisters, while at the time of the death of
the testatrix Mary Helen did have children, and the chil-
dren ultimately survived their mother and received the
property upon her death. It seems that it was this fact
(the existence of the children) which caused the Court
to classify the remainders as vested, for they state:
"The law is established in Maryland that where
there is a bequest to a person for life, with remainders
to his children, the remainders are contingent until
one of such children is born; * * *. But when a child
is born, and the remainderman is then ascertainable,
the remainder immediately becomes vested, * * *" .10
All of which is perfectly good law, quite consistent with
the definitions of vested and contingent remainders quoted
above, and entirely orthodox. But the Court then con-
tinues by saying:
"So a bequest to a certain person for life, and at
his death to any surviving child or children, but in
event he should die without issue, his estate should
.go to a third person gives a vested remainder to any
child of the life tenant immediately upon its birth.
The Court made the following statement: ". . . the remainders under
the testamentary trust for the benefit of Alfred .. .and under his deed of
trust were contingent, since he had no children, and these remainders did
not vest in interest until his death in 1940" [Italics supplied]. Safe De-
posit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Bouse, 29 A. (2d) 906, 909 (Md., 1943).
As to whether it is possible to have a vested remainder following a con-
tingent remainder see Loddington v. Kime, 1 Salk 224, 91 Eng. Rep. 198
(1695) ; Egerton v. Massey 3 C. B. (N. S.) 338, 140 Eng. Rep. 771 (1857) ;
FEARNE, op. cit. supra, n. 7, *225; GRAY, op. cit. supra, n. 7, Sec. 113.1; 1
SIMEs, op. Cit. 8upra, n. 7, Sec. 75; 2 TIFFNy, RmL PROpERTY (3rd Ed.
1939) Sec. 333.




* * * It is therefore our opinion that since Mrs. Plum-
mer [Mary Helen] had children, the remainders pass-
ing under the testamentary trust for her benefit and
under her deed of trust were vested remainders".11
There, it is submitted, is where the Court fell into error;
they failed to distinguish between a remainder to all chil-
dren of the life tenant and one limited only to those chil-
dren who are living at the time of the life tenant's death,
and to note that in the instant case the remainders were of
the latter type. When the remainder is limited to children
living at the death of the life tenant, there is imposed an
express condition of survivorship which makes the remain-
der contingent until after the termination of the life estate,
for prior to then the right of the remainderman to the
estate depends upon a contingent future event-whether
or not he survives the life tenant.2 In such a case not only
must a child be born but he must survive the life tenant
in order to qualify as a remainderman. Consequently, the
fact that Mary Helen had children at the time of the death
of the testatrix, while Alfred did not, should have made
no difference since the remainders were so limited as to
remain contingent in any event prior to the death of the
life tenants. Therefore, according to the traditional com-
mon law tests, all the remainders in the principal case
should have been held contingent and subject to the inher-
itance tax.
Two questions immediately arise: (1) Was there any
indication, previous to the decision in the Bouse case, that
the Court of Appeals had in similar situations abandoned
the traditional common law concepts of vested and con-
tingent remainders? (2) To what extent does the Bouse
case indicate such an abandonment? Both questions are
difficult to answer categorically, but a brief review of the
Maryland authorities indicates that previous to the Bouse
case the Court of Appeals had, with one possible exception,
adhered to the orthodox common law concepts. Thus re-
11 Ibid.
1 2 That this is the common law is recognized by all the authorities. For
example see GRAY, op. cit. supra, n. 7, Sec. 108, where it is stated that
"... on a devise to A for life, remainder to such of his children as survive
him, the remainder is contingent"; and 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, n. 9, Sec.
321, where the author says, "A gift in remainder to those of a class of per-
sons who may be surviving at a future time, as at the termination of the
particular estate, is contingent because, until then, the remaindermen
cannot be ascertained. So a gift to A for life, with a remainder to his
children or issue living at his death, creates a contingent remainder, since
the remaindermen cannot be ascertained until A's death . . .".
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mainders limited simply to children were classed as vested
subject to open up prior to the termination of the life estate,
provided there were some children in existence.13 On
the other hand remainders limited only to children who
survived the life tenant were generally held contingent
prior to the death of the life tenant. 4 For example, in
the case of Lansdale v. Linthicum,15 the testatrix left prop-
erty to her husband for life, followed by a remainder, upon
the death of the husband, to "such of my three children
* * * as shall be then living", and the remainder was held
contingent until the death of the husband, the Court
saying:
"The words 'then living' clearly refer to the time
of the death of the husband of the testatrix, the life
tenant, and as the will describes those who were to
take in remainders as 'such' of her children as were
living at the death of her husband * * * the evident
intention of the testatrix was to postpone the vesting
of the remainders until the death of her husband. The
devise was not to the testatrix's children, but only to
'such of' them as were living at the death of her hus-
band * * *" 18
Likewise, remainders limited to children (or more re-
mote issue) where there were none in existence, or to
children (or more remote issue) who survived the life
tenant, and in default of such then to others were held
to create alternative contingent remainders which would
not vest until the death of the life tenant. In one of the
leading cases, Lamour v. Rich,' the Court stated:
Stump v. Jordan, 54 Md. 619 (1880) ; Gilman v. Porter, 126 Md. 636,
95 A. 660 (1915). A similar result was reached when the remainder was
to the issue of the life tenant. Bishop v. Horney, 177 Md. 353, 9 A. (2d)
597 (1939), noted (1940) 5 Md. L. Rev. 98. And in the recent case of
Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 180 Md. 336, 24 A. (2d)
299 (1942), a remainder limited to "all my nephews and nieces" was held
to vest in the nephews and nieces living at the time of the death of the
testatrix rather than in those living at the death of the life tenant; the
court stressed the absence of any words indicating an intent to limit the
gift only to those nephews and nieces living at the time of the death of the
life tenant. 180 Md. 343, 24 A. (2d) 302.1 4 Reid v. Walbach, 75 Md. 205, 23 A. 472 (1892); Lee v. WaltJen, 141
Md. 450, 119 A. 246 (1922) ; Reilly v. Mackenzie, 151 Md. 216, 134 A. 502
(1926).
15 139 Md. 155, 115 A. 116 (1921).
16 139 Md. 158, 115 A. 117.
1 7 Demill v. Reid, 71 Md. 175, 17 A. 1014 (1889); Numsen v. Lyon, 87
Md. 31, 39 A. 533 (1898); Thorn v. Thom, 101 Md. 444, 61 A. 193 (1905) ;
Lewis v. Payne, 113 Md. 127, 77 A. 321 (1910) ; Schapiro v. Howard, 113
Md. 360, 78 A. 58 (1910); Mnmmm, op. cit. supra, n. 6, See. 225.
18 71 Md. 369, 18 A. 702 (1889).
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"The law, it may be conceded, favors the early vest-
ing of estates, and the courts will, as a general rule,
where there is more than one period mentioned, adopt
the earlier one, if there be no expressions or no intent
plainly deducible from the terms used, indicating that
the testator meant to select the later and not the earlier
period. * * * But the testator may, if he chooses, fix
the period of vesting to suit himself, provided he does
not transcend the time allowed by the rules of law.
He may defer that period and make the vesting of
the estate depend upon a contingency. When he has
done this with reasonable certainty his wishes will pre-
vail and the estate will not vest until the happening
of that contingency". 19
But in Hans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,20 a remainder,
following a trust for the lives of various persons, limited
to the "grandchildren then living" (referring to the death
of the last beneficiary) was said to be vested, prior to the
death of the beneficiaries, subject to being divested if the
grandchildren did not survive the termination of the trust.
The Court purported to distinguish other cases in which
similar interests had been held to be contingent by saying
that in those cases the testator had indicated an intention
that the estate should not vest until the death of the life
tenant; yet it is hard to imagine language which more
clearly indicates an intention to defer the vesting of the
interests than the words then living as used in the Hans
case. However, the case is of little significance as an au-
thority that such remainders are vested, because of the
alternative ground upon which the Court based its opin-
ion-res judicata; the latter theory amply justified the
holding. And in the more recent case of Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Sanford,21 property was placed in trust for
the life tenant and upon her death in further trust for the
period of twenty-one years, during which time the "net
interest and income" was to be paid to the "child or chil-
dren" of the life tenant; upon the termination of the trust(after the expiration of the twenty-one year period) it was
provided that the property "* * * shall then vest in and
become the absolute property and estate of any child or
children of [the life tenant]". The interest of the children
19 71 Md. 383, 18 A. 703-704. There are similar statements in the recent
case of Gittinger v. Farmers & Mechanics Nat. Bank, 180 Md. 640, 26 A.(2d) 414 (1942).
20 178 Md. 52, 12 A. (2d) 208 (1940), noted (1940) 5 Md. L. Rev. 98.
21 29 A. (2d) 657 (Md., 1943).
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was held vested prior to the termination of the trust. How-
ever, this result can be justified because the gift of the
income to the remaindermen prior to the termination of
the trust overcomes the apparent postponement of the vest-
ing indicated by the use of the words shall then.22  Thus,
with the exception of the equivocal decision in the Hans
case, the Court of Appeals had given no indication that it
was abandoning the traditional common law distinction
between vested and contingent remainders in such situa-
tions.
The answer to the second question is more difficult;
this difficulty is caused by the fact that there is nothing in
the opinion in the Bouse case to indicate that the Court
realized its holding was not consistent with the accepted
common law principles. Although the decision reaches
a result which is not in accord with the traditional concepts
of vested and contingent remainders, the rules and princi-
ples which the Court states and purports to follow are
entirely orthodox. It is a case in which there is a conflict
between the body of the opinion and the holding; a case
in which the reasoning does not sustain the decision.
Under such circumstances to attempt a prediction as to
the future effect of a decision is most hazardous; it is, in
fact, too hazardous an undertaking to attempt in the ab-
sence of an absolute necessity. One feels extremely sorry
for lawyers who, in drafting instruments, must decide just
what language is necessary in order to indicate with reason-
able certainty whether a vested or contingent remainder
is intended. But such a hazard ought not to exist; the
Court of Appeals should resolve this uncertainty at their
first opportunity and indicate with reasonable certainty
just what is the distinction between vested and contingent
remainders, just what language is necessary to create the
one or the other. And having done so they should con-
sistently follow the line of demarcation so that testators
will not be forced to choose their language subject to the
risk of judicial indecision.
22 In re Williams, L. R. [1907] 1 Ch. 180; Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N. Y.
183, 57 N. E. 312 (1900) ; Smith's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 140 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944) ; 2 SiMEs, op. cit. supra, n. 7, Sec.
356; RESTATEMENT, PROPMRTY (1940) Sec. 259. Compare Poultney v. Tif-
fany, 112 Md. 630, 77 A. 117 (1910) where property was placed in trust,
the income to be paid to the testator's widow for life, and upon her death
It was provided that ". . . this trust shall cease, and the property shall
then become the property of all my children . . ."; the Court quite prop-
erly held the remainder contingent prior to the death of the widow be-
cause, In the absence of a gift of the income to the remaindermen prior to
the widow's death, the words used indicated an intent to postpone the
vesting until that time.
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